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RECENT STATUTES
KIcK-BACK OF WAGES PROHIBITED.-The legislature of New York State, in an
attempt to strengthen its laws with respect to the payment of contract wages and
prevailing rates of wages, has seen fit to amend Section 962 of the Penal Law.1 The
practice of workers giving surreptitious "rebates" or "refunds" is not new in the
law.2 It is merely another form of indirection employed by unscrupulous persons
seeking to evade the spirit of the law and yet remain within its letter. The situa-
tion with respect to the so-called "kick-back" of wages is like that which has faced
the government when called upon to enforce fixed rates and uniform prices in vari-
ous industries. Formerly it was the general practice of many purchasers of large
quantities of goods to demand "special discounts" from their vendors. After the
passage of the statutes prohibiting such "discounts", they demanded a "rebate" of a
portion of the purchase price. The vendor, in many instances who was almost en-
tirely dependent upon one or two large customers, would often, when faced with the
alternative of complete economic ruin, accede to the demand. The resulting evil
did not confine itself to the mere loss of some profits by the vendor. It also wrought
havoc upon other purchasers who were then forced to compete with a larger com-
pany favored by these "special rates". In the case of the wage "kick-back" the em-
ployee is offered the same alternatives, viz: economic ruin or submission to the
demand. Again the second course is often chosen. In this case also the resultant
evil is not confined to the party directly subjected to the "threat". Persons who will
not accede to these demands must compete against this "cheap labor". Employers
1. N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 851.
2. The question of surreptitious rebates seems to have arisen whenever the govern-
ment has attempted to fix the price at which a person or corporation must sell his or Its
wares and services. The question first came into prominence in the latter half of the 19th
century when, because of abuses and monopolistic tendencies on the part of certain private
industries the government declared them to he "public utilities" or "fused with a public
interest" and therefore subject to government regulation and control. See 41 STAT. 484,
49 U. S. C. § 13 (4) (1934) and opinion of Mr. Justice Hughes in Simpson v. Shepard,
230 U. S. 352 (1913). Various rates for the services of these particular industries were
fixed by duly appointed commissions. Even this failed to check the evils at which they
aimed. As late as June 1936 it was necessary for Congress to amend the Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 730-740 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12-27 (1934) by prohibiting the practice of giving
rebates, discounts, allowances and special services to one competitor over another. 38 STAT.
730 (1911), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1934); 49 STAT. 1526-1528 (1936), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13,
13a (Supp. 1938). This was done in order "to force price discrimination out into the open
where they would be subject to the scrutiny of those interested, particularly competing
buyers." Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 96 F. (2d) 687, 692 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938). This type of legislation, prohibiting rebates is beginning to appear in almost
every instance where the legislature has decided upon a course of strict enforcement of
rates fixed either by contract or by law. 48 STAT. 1070 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1938)
(prohibiting rebates by telephone and telegraph companies engaged in interstate commerce) ;
41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 2 (1934) (by transportation companies engaged In
interstate commerce). N. Y. PuBaic SERvicE LAW (1907) § 31; (1930) § 65; (1913) § 79
(2); (1931) § 89b (2); (1910) § 91 (2) (prohibiting rebates by transportation companies,
railroads, common carriers, gas and electric light companies, water supply companies and
telephone and telegraph companies).
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who do pay the required wage must also suffer in that they must compete with
other employers in the particular industry who are having the same work done for
them by employees working, in effect, at a lower wage.4
Prior to the recent economic depression, little was heard of this particular evil.
While it is true that even during prosperous years many employees were paid ap-
pallingly low salaries, it was not necessary for the unscrupulous employer to resort
to the kick-back method to accomplish his purpose. The employer had merely to
refuse to pay the employee any more salary than that which he desired to pay.
It was not necessary to resort to indirection until the legislature enacted statutes
providing for "prevailing" and "minimum" wage rates.5
With the enactment of this legislation many employers themselves pressed on the
one side by lack of business resulting from the economic depression, and on the other
side by compulsory wage levels, attempted to reduce the actual cost of their pay-
roll by compelling their employees to return a portion of their salary. While it is
true that in many instances employers were seriously handicapped by the wage legis-
lation, it is also true that many employers who could afford to pay the prevailing or
minimum wage, were adamant in their refusal to do so. The evil was immediately
recognized and the law enforcement officers searched for a controlling statute.
Since the compulsion to return a portion of the employees' salary usually took the
form of a threat of discharge, the penal statutes most nearly applicable were those
relating to "Extortion"0 and "Coercion". 7 In December 1933 the Grand Jury of
New York County indicted one Joseph Cuddihy, charging him with "extortion" and
"coercion" in that he had secured a rebate of $17.50 from an employee by a "threat
of unlawful injury to Flynn's [the employee's] property, to wit, to discharge Flynn
and (sic) cause him to be discharged." A motion made to dismiss the indictment was
granted8 on the ground that the employee was a "free agent" and had no "property
interest" in his position.9 Despite the argument by the people, that the word "prop-
3. It will be noted that the major purpose of the wage statute v'i: to bring about and
maintain high standards of living becomes frustrated. The relative merits and demerits of
the practice of fixing wage rates by statute or by contract is an interesting que-tion. For
excellent discussions of this topic see: Comment, The Federal Wages and Hours Act (1939)
52 HMnv. L. Rv. 646; Comment, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Evils and Burdens ir.
Interstate Commerce (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 341; Comment, The Minrurn Wage Law
(1936) 11 ST. Jomw's L. REv. 78; Comment, The Proposed Federal Legislation on Miriurn
Wages and Hours (1938) 12 Sr. JoHN's L. Rtv. 292.
4. It is not only the employer who has engaged in this practice of forcing employees to
turn back a percentage of fixed amount of his or her salary. It is also prevalent among
unscrupulous labor unions and employment agencies. In these cazes however, the injury
falls not only upon the particular employees, but the employer may also suffer from the
general let-down and possible sabotage by the disgruntled employees.
5. See for example: N. Y. LABOR L.%w (1937) § 220 subd. 3 and § 550 et seq.; 52 STAT.
1062, 29 U. S. C. A. § 206 (1938).
6. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1917) §§ 850, 851.
7. N. Y. PENAL LAw (1882) § 530.
8. People v. Cuddihy, 151 M1isc. 318, 271 N. Y. Supp. 450 (Gen. Sess. 1934).
9. Extortion is defined as being the "obtaining of property from another . . . with his
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right:' N. Y.'
PENAL LAw (1917) § 850. The fear induced "may be by an oral or written threat: 1. To
do any unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened.... " N. Y.
PENAL LAW (1917) § 851. A person is guilty of coercion "who with a view to comrlJ an-
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erty" as used in the Penal Law with respect to the crime of extortion meant "any
type or species of valuable right and interest no matter how small1o and that under
subdivision 3 of Section 530 of the Penal Law," the element of an injury to a
property right is not necessary."1 The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion
and sustained the motion to dismiss.12
Immediately after the decision of the lower court, Section 962 of the Penal Law
was passed.' 3 This section provided that " ... whenever an agreement for the per-
formance of personal services required that that workmen engaged in its performance
shall be paid the prevailing rate of wages, it shall be unlawful for any person, either
for himself or any other person, to request, demand or receive either before or after
such workman is engaged, that such workman pay back, return, donate, contribute
or give any part or all of said workman's wages, salary or thing of value, to any
person, upon the statement, representation or understanding that failure to comply
with such request or demand will prevent such workman from procuring or retaining
employment . . ,,.14
This statute was, however, rather limited in scope'5 and its language faulty.1 0 The
courts held that the statute was limited to "personal service contracts" providing for
the payment of the "prevailing rate of wages"." 7 Although the court, in the case
of People v. Brill, 8 indicated that the statute would cover contracts for personat
services at the prevailing rate of wages, made by a labor union on behalf of its
members, with the employer, the statute itself was none too clear on the subject.
In 1938 a bill was introduced 19 substituting the language: " . . . whenever any
workman engaged to perform personal services shall be promised an agreed rate of
wages for said services, etc." This bill passed both houses of the legislature but was
vetoed by the Governor. The Court in the Brill case construed the fact that this bill
failed to be enacted into law as evidence that the statute as first enacted "was in-
tended to apply only where a contract for personal services", contained "a provision
for the payment of the prevailing rate of wages."20
other person to do or abstain from doing an act which such other person has a legal right
to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and unlawfully ... uses violence or inflicts injury
upon such other person or his family or a member thereof, or upon his property or
threatens such violence or injury; or . . . uses or attempts the intimidation of such person
by threats or force." N. Y. PExA, LAW (1882) § 530. (Italics inserted.)
10. Citing People ex rel. Short v. Warden of City Prison, 145 App. Div. 861, 863, 130.
N. Y. Supp. 698, 699 (1st Dep't 1911).
11. Appellant's brief, p. 21.
12. People v. Cuddihy, 234 App. Div. 694, 277 N. Y. Supp. 960 (1st Dep't 1935).
13. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 171.
14. Italics inserted.
15. People v. Brill, 255 App. Div. 452, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949 (1st Dep't 1938).
16. People v. Desowitz, 166 Misc. 1, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 87 (Mag. Ct. 1938).
17. See People v. Brill, 255 App. Div. 452, 458, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949, 954 (1st Dep't
1938), Callahan, J. concurred in the ruling that the statute applied only to contracts for
the "prevailing rate of wages"; but held that it applied to any such contract and not
merely to one for personal services.
18. Ibid.
19. N. Y. Senate Bill, No. 398 (1938).
20. People v. Brill, 255 App. Div-. 452, '455, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949, 953 (1st Dep't 1938).
(Italics inserted.)
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Oddly enough, the amended statute2' entirely omits any limitation to "personal
services" and uses the all inclusive term "labor". Further, the phrase 'prevailing
rate of wages" is also omitted and in its stead we have "an agreed rate of wages".
Thus it is unlawful for a person, either for himself or any other per-on, to request,
demand or receive, either before or after such workman is engaged, a return, dona-
tion of contribution of any part or all of said workman's wages, salary or thing of
value, upon the statement, representation or understanding that failure to comply
with such request or demand will prevent such workman from procuring or retain-
ing employment, whenever any workman who is engaged to perform labor Al be
promised an agreed rate of wages for his service, whether the promise be directly to
the employee22 or to a bona fide labor organization.P While the term "prevailing
wage contract" is omitted from the new amended statute, nevertheless it is sufficiently
broad to include such contracts within its purview, since a provision in contracts
promising payment of the prevailing rate of wages -4 necessarily constitutes "a
promise" of "an agreed rate of wages". Most salutary however, is the fact that no
longer is the statutes confined to contracts providing for payment of the prevailing
rate of wages,2 5 but includes every contract for wages regardless of the rate agreed
upon. The "rate agreed upon" must however, conform to the established minimum
wage laws of the state.26
21. N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 851.
22. N. Y. PE.NAL LAW (1939) § 962 (2).
23. N. Y. Pa-A. LAw (1939) § 962 (3).
24. Public and Government contracts must contain such a provision. N. Y. L,%'oa Lw
(1939) § 220 (3).
25. See People v. Brill, 255 App. Dliv. 452, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 949 (1st Dep't 1938).
26. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1937) § 550 et seq.
